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The Greater Middle East Covid-19 Crisis Management: Challenges and Opportunities
By Muhamad S. Olimat1

Abstract
The outbreak of the coronavirus (Covid-19) crisis in early 2020 took the whole world by
surprise. The world witnessed its horrific spread in Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and Brazil in utter disbelief and helplessness. The Greater Middle East (GME) region too faced
the pandemic-induced misfortune in no small measure. Governments and non-governmental
organizations scrambled to articulate a response equivalent to the challenges. While the crisis
clearly posed an unprecedented set of challenges in human history, it did provide some
opportunities as well. If nothing else, the crisis brought home the importance of pandemicpreparedness, biosecurity, health security, food security, social cohesion, public compliance, and
regional and international cooperation as succinctly as possible. While a few countries in the GME
region did succeed in stepping up to the challenge in the early six months of the crisis well into
the end of 2021, a few others fell considerably short in their response and are still struggling to
provide even basic anti-virus measures. This article provides a general overview of the GME’s
response to the Covid-19 pandemic and highlights some of the major challenges faced by the states
and society in the region and the opportunities thereof. The article also touches upon the policies,
efforts, opportunities, struggles, and challenges in the sub-regions of the GME: the Levant, the
Gulf, North Africa, and Central Asia.
Keywords: Greater Middle East, Coronavirus pandemic, Crisis management, Preparedness, Health
security, Economic growth, China, Wuhan, Response to the corona pandemic
The Greater Middle East: An Overview
The GME region extends from Western Sahara in North Africa to Tajikistan in Central
Asia at the Western borders of China. This region shares a set of cultural, demographic,
civilizational, historical, geographical, and geostrategic factors that render it unique in comparison
to other parts of the world. Its linkage with some of the old civilizations is quite strong. As a major
center of the current international trade, facilitated by the trade routes, the region engenders and
strengthens globalization. The fact that the region is an international trade destination does make
it a center of global rivalry too over raw materials, energy resources, markets, and communication
hubs. The GME region is endowed with an abundance of natural resources (minerals, raw
materials, fisheries, oil and gas, rivers and lakes, land, etc.) and human resources. At the same
time, the region faces existential challenges too as in the case of the absence of basic health services
in some parts of the region, water shortages, the spread of conflicts, and the mismanagement of
national wealth that affect its ability to respond to crises such as that posed by Covid-19.
Covid-19 and the Greater Middle East
In early 2020, the Chinese city of Wuhan reported the outbreak of a virus classified as
Covid-19. The news was a big blow and surprise to a world that is already suffering from structural
crises such as global warming; growing food and water security issues; the wars and conflicts in
several parts of the world, especially in the Middle East region; and the fierce rivalry among
1
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superpowers that threatens world security and stability. The surprise element was quite visible
going by the initial response of several countries, which was bogged down by confusion,
uncertainty, fear, and near demoralization. However, a few countries, including some Middle
Eastern countries, took up the challenge seriously in its early stages and set an example to be
emulated globally.
The Covid-19 crisis created a new line of thinking as far as research is concerned. Several
fields of knowledge such as political science, international relations, sociology, psychology,
medicine, biology, and biosecurity have examined the nature of the crisis and its impact on
societies and global health trends. Over the past year, several research endeavors examined the
response of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to the Covid-19 crisis, like studies
that have covered other parts of the world. For example, the US Peace Institute examined the
impact of coronavirus on how it would reshape the US foreign policy toward the Middle East.1
The Middle East Institute studied the impacts of Covid-19 on trends of conflict in the Middle East,
and concluded that it has exacerbated the conflicts in the region.2 The Organization for
Cooperation and Development provided an analytical perspective on the response of the MENA
region to the Covid-19 crisis.3 So did the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
when they examined the challenges faced by the region, especially in the areas of economic
contraction and the prospects of economic recovery in 2021-2022.4
The World Health Organization (WHO) has published a weekly operational update on
Covid-19 since the early weeks of the pandemic; this update covers the global health response to
the pandemic and provides data on sub-regions, including the Middle East. The Strategic
Preparedness and Response Plan (SPRP) of the WHO in 2021 brings together “efforts and
capacities for preparedness, response and health systems strengthening for the roll out of Covid19 tools” with the ultimate aim of ending the acute phase of the pandemic.5
In both region-specific and country-specific studies, the stress has been predominantly on
examining the impacts of the pandemic on politics, economics, development, conflict, stability,
instability, etc. For example, Weyland (2021) examined the challenges facing the Middle East
region in articulating an efficient response to the crisis. She touched upon the “the deep-rooted
politico-economic deficiencies” that stood in the way of “successfully addressing the pandemic’s
immediate and future consequences for human and national security in the MENA region.”6 Her
findings highlight the necessity of addressing such fundamental challenges and seeking external
support, especially the European Union’s (EU’s) assistance in mitigating the impacts of the crisis
within its Global Strategy for EU’s Foreign and Security Policy.
Saikal (2021) examined the “quadruple” nature of the challenge, i.e., the Covid-19,
conflicts in the region, the Jihadist threat, and the public discontent. The interaction between and
among these forces highlighted the volatility of the region and its instability.7 Özçürümez (2021)
examined the impacts of the crisis on Turkey. He stated that “the pandemic response in Turkey
can be classified as constituting a centralized governance model of public health centralism”. 8 As
Özçürümez highlighted, this model is challenged by data accuracy, data collection, effectiveness,
and sustainability.9 For a global challenge like Covid-19, he concludes, a global response is
required for its eradication in which no country is left behind.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) had carried out a thorough assessment on the impacts
of Covid-19 with particular focus on conflicts around the world. While the group recognized the
enormity of the challenge and the impacts of the pandemic on escalating existing conflicts, it also
recognized the opportunities that it has provided for rivals globally. When it comes to the Middle
East, the ICG stated that, “the scale of the outbreak creates room for humanitarian gestures between
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rivals. The UAE has, for example, airlifted over 30 tons of humanitarian aid to Iran to deal with
the disease…states with closer relations with Iran, including Kuwait and Qatar, have also proffered
assistance.”10 Moreover, major research institutions around the world, especially those with a
mandate to cover the Middle East region, have published special issues and reports, and held
roundtable discussions on the region and its ability to withstand the crisis. The research institutions
include The Middle East Institute, the US Peace Institute, The Center for Middle East Policy at
The Brookings Institute, and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University.
Regional Trends and the Covid-19 Crisis
There are several trends that can be identified in terms of the GME’s response to the Covid19 crisis. These trends deal with the challenges and opportunities faced by individual nation-states
within the GME region. Such factors (conflict and instability, economic contraction, and
governmental effectiveness) mostly limited and hindered state and regional response to the corona
crisis as they have systematically undermined the region’s potential since the mid-20th century
onwards. A brief on these hindering factors is given below.
Conflict and Instability
The Middle East is characterized by the dominance of political violence, instability,
conflicts, wars, and civil strife over the past century. Most recently, the region has been struck
with a wave of rebellions, revolutions, and civil strife within the framework of “Arab Spring”,
which broke out towards the end of 2010. Since then, the region has witnessed a diverse set of
phenomena such as state disintegration, state failure, and state collapse, especially in the Arab
World, in the Mashreq (Syria), the Maghreb (Libya), and the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen).
Previously, the region suffered deeply from the consequences of the US invasion of Iraq,
which led to a state of instability due to the rise of terrorist activities in Iraq, leading to a massive
level of casualties, and displacement of millions of civilians in Iraq and across the world. The same
trend of violence applies to the consequences of the War on Terror in the 2000s; political violence
dominated the Palestinian and Israeli scene due to the collapse of the Peace Process. The 1990s
was characterized by regional violence due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The same trend applies
to the previous four decades well back into the Second World War (WWII).
Therefore, conflict, political violence, civil strife, sectarian divisions, terrorism, and
instability have been a feature of the region, which has most certainly complicated the ability of
nation-states in the region to confront national and regional challenges such as pandemics, food
security, water security, and overall regional stability. Table 1 illustrates the Political Stability
Index of the region. The low scores indicate high rates of political instability and political violence.
Table 1. Middle East Political Stability/No Violence Index Scores
Country
Qatar
UAE
Oman
Kuwait
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Morocco

Score/percentage
87.74
83.02
72.17
66.98
51.98
50.00
48.58
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Country
Mauritania
Israel
Algeria
Turkey
Egypt
Iran
Lebanon

Score/Percentage
34.43
29.77
28.77
18.40
18.00
10.38
10.85
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Jordan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Bahrain
Tunisia
Saudi Arabia

47.64
44.81
43.40
45.28
41.98
39.62
36.79

Sudan
Palestine
Libya
Iraq
Yemen
Syria

10.38
8.02
3.77
3.77
2.36
2.36

Source: Table is compiled from data published by the World Bank http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (accessed on 23 October 2021)

Economic Contraction
The GME’s economic potential was arrested by the prevalence of wars, conflicts, and
instability, exacerbated by the geopolitical nature of the region. Regional rivalry was also a major
impediment to stability and a primary factor for the decline in the economic performance of the
region in comparison to other parts of the world. The conflicts between the major forces in the
region such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia led to the escalation of instability in Iraq and
Lebanon, and the persistence of the war in Syria, Yemen, and Libya.
While the Arab world was hit hard by such conditions, the non-Arab Middle Eastern
countries (Israel, Iran, and Turkey) were also active participants in the creation of instability,
though performing better on the economic front. While the collapse of the peace process escalated
the Israeli–Palestinian confrontations, wars, conflicts, violence, and economic destruction
especially in Palestine, the Iranian intervention in other parts of the region undermined the overall
stability of the Middle East. Economic development has also been undermined by the rising level
of conflict among rivals in the region. In fact, the Middle Eastern rivals have also attempted to
export their rivalry into Central Asia. Their current efforts were met with opposition by wellestablished interests in the region, namely China and Russia.
It is pertinent to remind that economic development and national unity were the two main
objectives of nation-states in the independence era of the region since early 1940s. Economic
growth rates of nation-states in the Middle East have been less than successful in accomplishing
any of these two goals. On the contrary, economic contraction is the most visible aspect of the
Covid-19 crisis. In April 2020, the IMF estimated regional contraction to the tune of –4% for the
year 2020, while the real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate for 2021 is estimated at
2.7%.11 This decline in growth rate is consistent with the global economic trends, which pegged
the contraction rate at 3% in 2020.12 However, the IMF estimated that a global recovery this year
(2021) would lead to an economic growth rate of 5.8% globally.
The economic performance of the Middle East during the crisis in 2020/21 is consistent
with other parts of the world that have witnessed major economic decline. The IMF’s World
Economic Outlook for 2020 illustrates this trend clearly. The IMF stated in April 2020 that, “the
Covid-19 pandemic will severely impact growth across all regions”13 Table 2 presents IMF data
for April 2020 and October 2021, which demonstrates the catastrophic impacts of the pandemic
on the world economy. The projections for 2020 and the actual growth rates for 2020 show the
depth of economic contraction. In fact, the actual rates in many parts of the world were much
higher than projected rates a year ago as in the case of the Euro region (–6.3), Spain (–10.8), UK
(–9.8), and that applies to the rest of the world. The figures for the Middle East and Central Asia
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show that its economic growth contracted by 2.8%, though expected to recover by the end of 2021,
registering a projected rate of 4.1% in 2021 and 2022.
Table 2 Real GDP Annual Percentage Change: Latest World Economic Outlook Growth
Projections in April 2020, and the October 2021 Latest World Economic Outlook Growth
Projections
Region/Country 2019
Actual
World Output
2.9
Advanced
1.7
Economies
United States
2.3
Euro Area
1.2
Germany
0.6
France
1.3
Italy
0.3
Spain
2.0
Japan
0.7
United Kingdom 1.4
Canada
1.6
Other Advanced 1.7
Economies
Emerging And
3.7
Developing
Markets
Emerging and
5.5
Developing Asia
China
6.1
India
4.2
ASEAN-5
4.8
Emerging and
2.1
Developing
Europe
Russia
1.3
Latin America
0.1
and the
Caribbean
Brazil
1.1
Mexico
–0.1
Middle East and 1.2
Central Asia
Saudi Arabia
0.3
Sub-Saharan
3.1
Africa

2020
Projection
–3.0
–6.1

2021
Projection
5.8
4.5

2020
Actual
–3.1
–4.5

2021
Projection
5.9
5.2

2022
Projection
4.9
4.5

–5.9
–7.5
–7.0
–7.2
–9.1
–8.0
–5.2
–6.5
–6.2
–4.6

4.7
4.7
5.2
4.5
4.8
4.3
3.0
4.0
4.2
4.5

–3.4
–6.3
–4.6
–8.0
–8.9
–10.8
–4.6
–9.8
–5.3
–1.9

6.0
5.0
3.1
6.3
5.8
5.7
2.4
6.8
5.7
4.6

5.2
4.3
4.6
3.9
4.2
6.4
3.2
5.0
4.9
3.7

–1.0

6.6

–2.1

6.4

5.1

1.0

8.5

–0.8

7.2

6.3

1.2
1.9
–0.6
–5.2

9.2
7.4
7.8
4.2

2.3
–7.3
–3.4
–2.0

8.0
9.5
2.9
6.0

5.6
8.5
5.8
3.6

–5.5
–5.2

3.5
3.4

–3.0
–7.0

4.7
6.3

2.9
3.0

–5.3
–6.6
–2.8

2.9
3.0
4.0

–4.1
–8.3
–2.8

5.2
6.2
4.1

1.5
4.0
4.1

–2.3
–1.6

2.9
4.1

–4.1
–1.7

2.8
3.7

4.8
3.8
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Nigeria
South Africa
Low-Income
Developing
Countries
Emerging
Market and
Middle-Income
Economies

2.2
0.2
5.1

–3.4
–5.8
0.4

2.4
4.0
5.6

–1.8
–6.4
0.1

2.6
5.0
3.0

2.7
2.2
5.3

NA

NA

NA

–2.3

6.7

5.1

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2021. Accessed on
October 23, 2021 at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/10/12/worldeconomic-outlook-october-2021
Governmental Effectiveness
Among multiple factors, a government’s effectiveness and ability to manage a crisis
through the mobilization of the state and society remains a critical one. The World Bank has been
publishing a report on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) since 1996. The report rates
a government’s performance on six broad factors: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political
stability and absence of violence/terrorism, (3) effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law,
and (6) control of corruption. When it comes to the management of crisis owing to a pandemic, all
the above factors are important, but governmental effectiveness (GE) assumes higher importance.
The World Bank neatly defines GE as “capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to
such policies”.14
Table 3 ranks countries from the highest to the lowest in terms of GE scores. The scores
indicate that a few countries in the GME region fall in the “highest” category. While most countries
fall in the “acceptable” or “D” category, many countries in the region sit in the “failed” category.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been ranked as one of the most effective governments not
only in the Middle East but also worldwide based on its effective handling of the crisis, mitigating
its impact on the economy, providing a wide range of social services, generous economic stimulus
packages, and a wide range of humanitarian assistance worldwide.
At the other end of the spectrum, Yemen, Syria, Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, Mauritania,
Tajikistan, and Libya are seen as having weak and failed governments as they could not mobilize
governmental or societal support to combat crises facing their countries. The common factors
among these countries and others in the vicinity such as Lebanon and Sudan are the issues of
conflicts, wars, instability, and civil strife.
Table 3. Middle East Governmental Effectiveness Indicator Scores
Country
UAE
Israel
Qatar
Bahrain

https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol23/iss3/2

Score/Percentage
95.19
90.87
86.54
75.96

Country
Kyrgyzstan
Algeria
Egypt
Tajikistan

Score/Percentage
47.12
46.63
42.79
40.87
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Saudi Arabia
Kazakhstan
Oman
Jordan
Morocco
Turkey
Kuwait
Tunisia
Uzbekistan
Palestine

71.15
70.67
71.63
69.71
63.94
63.94
62.50
57.21
50.00
49.04

Mauritania
Iran
Turkmenistan
Lebanon
Iraq
Sudan
Syria
Libya
Yemen

37.98
29.81
24.04
19.71
15.87
12.50
10.10
3.85
1.92

Source: Compiled from data provided by the World Bank.
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (accessed on 23 October 2021)
In fact, the lack of effectiveness boils down to the overall weakness, collapse, and failure
of the public healthcare systems across the region. Perhaps that explains the rising percentages of
mortality rates in some countries of the region. The healthcare system has nearly completely
collapsed in Syria, Yemen, and Libya.
Regionalism and Pandemic-Response Methods
The coronavirus crisis has brought to light the importance of regional cooperation in
eradicating “regional and international” health challenges. As viruses do not recognize the concept
of “sovereignty”, regional responses are necessary. While the GME represents a geographic,
cultural, and civilizational zone, lack of coordination between and among its sub-regions and
countries has come out as a major weakness that hampered the region’s ability to put up a
coordinated and unified response to a collective threat. Rivalries weakened regionalism and
conflicts made it difficult to deal with the pandemic collectively. This is an important lesson that
Covid-19 crisis has taught to all regions of the world.
Therefore, the necessity of developing regional mechanisms for combatting the spread of
diseases holds immense value. When there is an example of regional cooperation and coordination
working well around security especially regarding the threat of terrorism, extending such
camaraderie for securing region-wide healthcare presents itself as an opportunity. That explains
why health security at regional and international levels must be a top priority item on the agenda
of the international community.
In the case of Middle East, the absence of regional mechanism to confront the challenge is
an indication of the failure of multilateral cooperation, despite that fact that the region has
underlined the necessity of regional cooperation since 1945. Regional institutions such as the Arab
League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab Maghreb Union have no significant role to
play in managing or combatting the threat of the pandemic. The chaos in past two years have
demonstrated, in no uncertain terms, the necessity of regional coordination to effectively confront
and contain cross-border challenges.
The GME region is divided into sub-manageable regions such as the Levant, the Gulf,
North Africa, and Central Asia, all of which lacks regional coordination mechanisms, centers,
frameworks, paradigms, etc. The pandemic should be a sufficient reason to promote such
coordination ignoring the traditional obstacles for regional cooperation. These impediments
include sovereignty concerns, conflicts and border disputes, political crises, economic challenges,
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etc. Overriding all such impediments, the pandemic has made it clear that a national response to
regional and international crises is insufficient. It has underlined the importance of regional
cooperation and coordination. In this regard, the preparatory response mechanism could begin with
the establishment of a Greater Middle East Regional Crisis Management Center to deal with such
impending threats as pandemics, environmental catastrophes, water security, food shortages,
regional security threats, and mass movement of people.
Political Legitimacy and Public Support
The corona crisis has tested the political legitimacy and the level of public support that the
people accord for their governments across the region. Overall, the crisis has contributed to
undermining and eroding the political legitimacy of the ruling elites across the region, especially
in countries that have demonstrated clear failure in dealing with the crisis as in Lebanon, Yemen,
Libya, Algeria, Syria, Iran, and other countries. The crisis has also deepened the multiplicity of
political crises facing the region at large. While this is a clear challenge, it can be also a valuable
opportunity for the state and the ruling elites to build bridges with the society and mend the gaps
between the two sides. At the same time, there are allegations of corruption and mismanagement
of public funds by the ruling elites. There is no denying the fact that corrupt governments and
institutions contribute substantially to the deterioration of the public health sector. For example,
the weak response to the pandemic in such countries as Lebanon, Algeria, Iraq, and Yemen is clear
evidence of the waste in the health sector and corruption that stripped these countries of basic
healthcare services despite billions of dollars flowing into the sector.
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
The presence of millions of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) across the
region added another dimension to state and regional difficulties in dealing with the corona crisis.
The wars in Syria alone produced 13.5 million refugees and IDPs. Iraq’s wars, conflicts, instability,
and sectarian violence produced 9 million IDPs, while the Yemen war produced 5 million IDPs,
and an unidentified number of refugees across the Middle East, into Europe, and into the Far East.
State’s capacity to provide necessities for the refugees and IDPs such as food, shelter, and
medicines is restricted by factors such as the collapse of the healthcare sector in these countries,
the mismanagement of public funds, and the presence of militias and terrorist organizations in
Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Security threats are a major impediment to providing refugees with
necessities. Efforts of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees are also less than
expectations, which makes dealing with the refugee crisis much more difficult in times of
pandemics and natural catastrophes.
Greater Middle Eastern Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic
The GME region is divided into four sub-regions: the Gulf, the Levant, North Africa, and
Central Asia. This section provides an overview of the sub-regional and state response to the
coronavirus pandemic crisis.
The Arab Gulf Region
The Arab Gulf Region encompasses members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)2
Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. The response of the Gulf region to the pandemic ranged from exceptionally
successful cases as in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, to the most challenged countries in the
2

Members of the GCC are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain.
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region as in the case of Iran, Iraq, Oman, and Yemen; Qatar and Kuwait managed the crisis fairly
well. One of the most noticeable aspects of crisis management in the GCC member states is the
pro-active approach followed by the authorities in some countries. The states announced early
lockdown, curfews, transferred education to distance education, banned public gatherings, and
provided significant economic stimulus packages. Table 4 provides some vital statistics for the
Gulf region. It demonstrates the impacts of the pandemic on the region’s economic growth and
contraction in 2020 and 2021. Across the board, the Gulf region suffered economic contraction
ranging from –2.8% as in Oman to –15.7% as in the case of Iraq, while the projected economic
growth rate in 2021 ranged from –2% in Yemen to 3.6% in Iraq. However, the ability of the GCC
countries to respond well to the crisis without any major economic turbulence is attributed to their
foreign reserves and sovereign fund assets.
Table 4. Current Vitals Statistics for the Gulf Region
Country Population Size
(Number) (km²)

Bahrain
Iraq
Iran
Saudi
Arabia
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
UAE
Yemen

Gross
Domestic
Product
(GDP)
(US$
Billion)

Gross
Life
GDP
National Expectancy 2020 Real
Income (Years)
Change (%)
per
capita
US$

2021
Projected
Growth Rate
(%)

1,641,164
40,220,00
82,913,893
34,268,529

780
434,128
1,628
2,149

38.475
167.200
258.245
688.586

22,170
–
3,640
22,840

77.29
–
76.67
75.13

–5.1
–15.7
3.4
–4.1

2.4
3.6
2.5
2.8

4,207,077
4,974,992
2,832,071
9,770,526
29,161,922

17,820
309,500
11,490
71,020
527,970

136.197
76.332
178.838
421,142
23.48

36,290
14,150
58,830
43,470
940

75.48
77.86
80.22
77.97
66.12

–8.9
–2.8
–3.6
–6.1
–8.5

0.9
2.5
1.9
2.2
–2

Source: The International Monetary Fund, October 2021. World Economic Outlook. Accessed
on October 23, 2021, at: file:///C:/Users/EDA023/Downloads/text.pdf
Size and Population: WB at:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?view=map Accessed on November 11,
2021.
Overall, the Arab Gulf region’s response to the pandemic can be considered as proactive.
The state took the lead in using its agencies, financial resources, security agencies, and its overall
ability to mobilize state resources to deal with crises. The UAE took a proactive policy towards
the crisis at domestic, regional, and international levels. Domestically, the state secured enough
and more Covid-19 testing and treatment capacity. It has also secured supplies of food stuffs and
secured uninterrupted supply chains throughout the crisis. It has also adopted drastic measures in
terms of quarantine, isolation, distance education, reduced international flights, partial curfews,
total lockdowns, banning public gatherings such as weddings, and initiated a massive awareness
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campaign across the country. The multicultural nature of the UAE enabled it to promote an
outstanding approach towards its people. Regionally speaking, the UAE provided necessary
medical assistance to neighboring countries in the region such as Iran, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia,
Mauritania, and other countries across the Middle East. The UAE sent aid to China during the
early months of the crisis; the Philippines, South Africa, Croatia, Belarus, Ethiopia, and other
countries also received aid from the UAE. The UAE had also assisted in the repatriation process
of some nationalities.
The UAE government redefined its priorities considering the pandemic concentrating on
new sectors and made major shifts in the governmental structure and cabinet portfolios. The focus
shifted to strategic sectors, health security, food security, and economic security for the post-Covid
period. The government identified six major sectors that are at the center of governance and
development: health, education, economy, food security, society, and government. This is a
comprehensive approach to combatting the crisis and its post-crisis consequences. Overall, the
UAE registered 739,381 cases, 2131 deaths, and administered 20,921,016 vaccines as on 27
October 2021. Table 5 captures the Gulf region’s response specific to Covid-19.
Table 5. The Gulf Region’s Covid-19 Status as of 23 October 2021
Country

Number of Cases

Number of
Number of Vaccines
Deaths
Administered
Bahrain
276,608
1,393
2,746,461
Iraq
2,047,811
22,993
8,972,041
Iran
245,058,083
4,973,384
6,888,779
KSA
548,303
8,780
45,381,812
Kuwait
412,557
2,461
2,668,082
Oman
304,183
4,110
5,679,984
Qatar
238,640
609
4,815,431
UAE
739,381
2,131
20,921,016
Yemen*
9,694
1,850
NA*
*Yemen’s statistics should be considered with caution due to the fact that the country is going
through a civil war.
Source: The John Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering, the Covid-19 Database.
Available at: https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (accessed on 23 October 2021).
Saudi Arabia initiated a proactive policy in dealing with the pandemic at its early stages.
Its quest to control its spread was driven by several factors; its experience with SARS in 2013 tops
the list. Secondly, Saudi Arabia is the home of Islam’s two holiest shrines. Therefore, ensuring the
safety of pilgrims became a national priority. In this regard, the government implemented strict
policies as in closing its borders, limiting international flights, closing the holy places for pilgrims,
and restricting the 2020 and 2021 Hajj seasons to nationals and residents to just 1000 in 2020 and
60,000 in 2021. Saudi Arabia imposed curfews and ban on public gathering and travelling between
provinces. It also restricted travelling to neighboring countries, especially to the Kingdom of
Bahrain, which was used by some nationals to travel to Iran, via Lebanon. To top all these
measures, the government also implemented an ambitious vaccination scheme. Its efforts paid off.
As of October 2021, the government has removed the social distancing policy at the holy places
and opened its borders and airports to receive worshippers visiting the Holy shrines in Mecca and
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Medina. Saudi Arabia registered 548,303 cases, 8,780 deaths, and administered 45,381,812
vaccines.
The Kingdom of Bahrain also initiated a proactive response to the pandemic. Bahrain
enjoyed average and above-average economic growth rates over the past four decades: 7.3% in
1980, 8.3% in 2006 (highest), 2% in 2011 (declined due to political unrest), 5.4% in 2018, and –
5.1 in 2020 (owing to Covid-10 pandemic). Its economic growth rate is expected to improve to
2.4% in 2021.15
As regards response to the pandemic, Bahrain imposed curfews and lockdown. The
government used its instruments to mobilize governmental support to good effect and brought the
pandemic under control. Overall, Bahrain registered 276,608 cases, 1,393 deaths, and administered
2,746,461 vaccines. Vaccination was offered free of charge for first and second doses, while the
government is encouraging a third booster dose, like other Gulf countries.
Iran emerged as one of the epicenters of the pandemic, especially in the early months of
2020. Iran was hit repeatedly by virus waves, driven by lack of preparedness and inability of the
state to curb the spread of the virus across the country. There are several factors identified as
contributing to the crisis in Iran. Apart from the unpreparedness of the Iranian authorities, the
Iranian people at large provided no substantial support to state policies, especially around
compliance, due to lack of confidence and trust in the government. Religious holidays and spiritual
seasons in major religious centers such as Qum and Mashhad permitted large gathering, which
furthered the spread of the virus among communities. Iran’s outdated health sector, equipment,
and systems were also unable to cope up with the increasing demand on healthcare services. Iranian
officials blamed the American-led sanctions on Iran as a major factor in their inability to deal with
the crisis. However, the healthcare sector, including medicines and related needs, was exempted
from sanctions. The WHO organized several shipments through the UAE to assist the health
authorities in Iran to respond to the crisis. China, Russia, and other countries sent shipments of
necessary equipment and even Covid-19 vaccines. In fact, Iran’s partnership with China and its
“support” to Beijing exacerbated the crisis in the critical months of January, February, and March
of 2020. Some Iranian airlines had regular flights to China, thus contributing to the spread of the
virus in the country. Utter disregard to flying precautions added to the misery. It seemed foreign
policy consideration surpassed health considerations at home at a time when the knowledge of the
formidable virus itself was limited.
Iran’s domestic predicament in dealing with the pandemic was also restrained by its
geopolitical involvement in regional affairs. The Iranian people held their government responsible
for the deterioration of the healthcare sector and public services due to its deep involvement in the
proxy war in Syria, intervention in the civil and proxy war in Yemen, its deep involvement in Iraqi
affairs, as well as its support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. On the other side, the government blames
the sanctions regime imposed by the US due to its nuclear program ambitions. Above all, Iran’s
response to the crisis was also restricted by the deterioration of regime-legitimacy, and the lack of
public support to the government policies. The Iranian people blames the hardliners and the
Revolutionary Guard for the ills of the country. The Guards’ interests and devotion to regional
rivalry outdid domestic needs and challenges. The hardliners control the government and public
funds. They view domestic needs as secondary to the regional goals of the so-called “the Iranian
Project”. On the domestic front, regime strength is more important than public needs. Shifting the
blame on the US and the sanctions regime and distracting the Iranian people with regional
adventurism created a catastrophic effect in every home in the country. Overall, Iran registered
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245,058,083 cases, 4,973,384 deaths, while administered only 6,888,779 vaccines out of a
population that exceeds 84 million.
Iraq’s response to the crisis was also governed by domestic conditions characterized by
instability, wars, and conflicts over the past two decades. The impact of regional factors
contributed to it further. However, the Iraqi government encouraged the people to abide by the
curfews and lockdowns, though with a limited capacity. Iraq’s real GDP growth declined swiftly
to –15.7%; however, the economy is expected to improve with its 2021 GDP growth rate
anticipated to touch 3.6%. Overall, Iraq registered 2,047,811 cases, registered the highest death
rate in the GME at 22,993, and administered 8,972,041 vaccines.
The State of Qatar took an active role in combatting the crisis. The government initiated a
national response including curfews, lockdown, distance education, banning public gatherings,
closing airports and ports, and providing a generous national stimulus package. Overall, Qatar
registered 238,640 cases, 609 death cases, and administered 4,815,431 vaccines.
Similarly, Kuwait and Oman initiated national response plans including lockdowns,
curfews, and distance education methods. Kuwait registered 412,557 thousand cases, 2,461 deaths,
and administered 2,668,082 vaccines. The Sultanate of Oman registered 304,183 cases, 4,110
deaths, and administered 5,679,984 vaccines.
The Republic of Yemen can be classified as the worst case in the GME in terms of response
to the crisis. The situation in Yemen is classified by the UN as the worst current humanitarian
disaster, in which 80% of the population or 24 million people need assistance and protection.16
Yemen’s instability, civil wars, and proxy wars have crippled the country over the past century. It
has arrested Yemen’s potential as a trade-oriented civilization, and undermined its stability,
prosperity, and social cohesion. Yemen is hit hard by Arab Spring since 2011, and its catastrophic
consequences. The collapse of the government in 2015 and the takeover of the northern region by
a rebel militia, the Saudi–Arab Coalition intervention, and domestic and regional rivalries
destroyed Yemen’s already weak infrastructure and undermined any ability of the country to
confront a challenge on the level of a pandemic such as Covid-19. The war displaced over 5 million
people, forced an unidentified number of migrants, and gave rise to a near-famine situation. UN
sources estimate that 24 million people in Yemen need humanitarian assistance. The war in Yemen
destroyed its infrastructure and led to the collapse of its already outdated heath sector. While
statistics are most certainly inaccurate, and must be taken with caution, Yemen reported 9,694,000
cases and 1,850 deaths; no data is available on vaccines.
The Levant Region
The response of countries in the Levant region was governed by such factors as the state
of the economy, demographic factors, the presence of millions of refugees and displaced people,
in addition to the war in Syria and the instability in Lebanon. Table 6 provides some data on the
Levant region. It illustrates the economic contraction rates in 2020, and the projected growth rates
in 2021.
Table 6. Vital Statistics for the Levant Region
Country Population Size
(km²)

Gross
Domestic
Product
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10,230

(US$
Billion)
51.992

(US$ per
capita)
7,420

78.93

27.4

Rate
(%)
–25.0

Lebanon

6,855,709

Jordan
Palestine
Israel
Iraq
Syria
Turkey

10,101,697 88,780 44.503
4,410
74.53
15.7
–1.6
4,685,306
6,020
17.134
3,930
74.10
29.2
–11.5
9,054,000
21,640 394,652
43,070
82.81
NA
–2.2
39,309,789 434,128 190,644
4,840
70,60
18.9
–15.7
17,070,132 183,630 40,405
1,820
72.70
35.2
83,429,607 769,630 778.377
9,690
77.70
14.4
1.8
Source: The International Monetary Fund, October 2021. World Economic Outlook. Accessed on
October 23, 2021 at: file:///C:/Users/EDA023/Downloads/text.pdf
Size and Population: WB at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?view=map
(accessed on 11 November 2021)

No
Data
2.0
4.4
7.1
3.6
9.0

The Levant region’s response varied from a proactive approach as in Turkey, Jordan, and
Israel to negligence as in the case of Lebanon to near-absence of the state as in the case of Syria.
Table 7 illustrates the number of cases, deaths, and vaccines administered across the region.
Table 7. Covid-19 Status in the Levant Region
Country Number of Cases
Number of Deaths Number of Vaccines Administered
Lebanon 648,782
8,561
3,443,982
Jordan
853,012
10,965
7,378,157
Palestine 451,459
4,636
NA
Israel
1,324,451
8,062
15,856,058
Iraq
2,047,811
22,993
8,972,041
Syria
41,799
2,517
963,477
Turkey
7,879,438
69,344
115,480,511
Source: The John Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering, the Covid-19 Database.
Available at: https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (accessed on October 23, 2021).
Jordan imposed a strict curfew and lockdown system carried out by the military and the
security agencies. The aim was to contain the spread of the virus at its early stages. Challengers to
the newly issued “Defense Orders” were arrested and fined heavily. The curfew/lockdown
measures were comprehensive in nature at the beginning and included all sectors of the economy
such as education, tourism, transportation, and industry. With only a few sectors open such as the
health services, these measures brought the infection rate to zero at times, but then the outbreak
nearly went out of control. Overall, Jordan registered 853,012 cases, 19,962 deaths, and
administered 7,378,157 vaccines.
The health of Jordan’s economy is usually a reflection of the regional stability or instability.
The protracted war in Syria and Iraq and the collapse of the peace process, the continued tension
and conflict between Palestine and Israel, coupled with internal political developments tested the
ailing economy. Jordan remained afloat with support from its Gulf and European allies, the US,
and international financial institutions. All its supporters view the stability of Jordan as strategic
to the stability of the Middle East at large. Jordan hosts millions of refugees crossed to Jordan
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because of the wars in Syria, and other neighboring countries. Its major Syrian camp in Mafraq is
a source of discomfort to the authorities as another corona wave from here could severely dent its
already stressed healthcare sector. Jordan highlighted the burden-sharing responsibility of the
Syrian refugees by calling for support to aid the camps.
The Palestinian response to the crisis is governed by a set of factors, in which occupation
tops the list. Secondly, the weak healthcare sector and the general decline of its economy slackened
the response of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which, in turn, undermined its ability to
confront the threat. In addition, corruption among the PNA’s rank and file, the bureaucracy, and
the national division between the two governments operating in Gaza Strip and Ramallah further
crippled the pandemic response system. Israeli restrictions on the PNA, lockdowns, and
restrictions on the Palestinian economy also contributed to the weak response. The PNA’s falling
legitimacy among Palestinians and the resultant lack of public support, autocratic nature,
intolerance to dissent, and corruption made the Palestinian people denounce the authority’s
measures such as declaring a state of emergency. Furthermore, the Palestinian people do question
the rationality of the “security” cooperation with Israel especially when Israeli authorities
prioritized their own health situation instead of pursuing a unified approach to benefit both
communities. Such policy measures did not cut ice with the Palestinian people and thus erased any
hopes of cooperation between the two sides to confront a unified enemy, Covid-19. Overall,
Palestine registered 451,459 cases and 4,636 deaths; no data is available on vaccines administered.
Israel’s approach to the crisis was hailed as exemplary. The government imposed curfews,
lockdowns, and provided wide range of social services. The government also banned public
gatherings, and closed ports and airports. Overall, Israel registered 1,324,451 cases, 8,062 deaths,
and ran an ambitious vaccination program, which saw 15,856,058 vaccine shots being
administered.
Turkey has been hit hard by the pandemic like other parts of the Middle East. The
government imposed a state of emergency but kept its export-oriented economy open. The Turkish
aviation and tourism sectors were hit hard by the closure, curfews, and lockdowns. In 2019, Turkey
received over 41 million guests. In terms of its response to the pandemic, Turkey has a better
healthcare sector as compared to its Middle Eastern counterparts. The government took drastic
steps to respond to the pandemic in the early months of the crisis. It imposed curfews, closure of
public places such as restaurants and religious institutions, in addition to banning flights from the
most affected countries. Simultaneously, Turkey kept some of its airports open, though at a lower
capacity as the country relied heavily on its aviation industry for revenue generation. Overall,
Turkey registered 7,879,438 cases, 69,344 deaths, and administered 115,480,511 vaccines.
Lebanon reported 648,782 cases, 8,561 deaths and a vaccination rate at 23.4% of the total
population. It’s estimated that, 3,498,563 vaccines were administered in the country. In the case
of Syria, the civil war has crippled the state and the healthcare sector’s ability to respond to the
pandemic. The number of cases in Syria are estimated at 46,421, while 2,672 succumbed to the
virus, and only 2.95% of the population is fully vaccinated. It’s estimated that only 1,125,146
vaccines were administered in the country, which is the lowest in the region.
The North African Region
The Covid-19 virus reached the Maghreb region in mid-late March of 2020. Like other
parts of the GME region, North Africa’s response to the crisis was governed by domestic, regionalgeopolitical, and international factors. On the domestic front, Libya is witnessing a protracted
civil/proxy war since 2010, while Algeria faced two years of sustained protest called Hirak.
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Tunisia witnessed turbulence due to the instability of its government and its transition process to
democracy. Sudan witnessed two military coups over the past two years, and a catastrophic
economic collapse and a wide spread of the virus. Egypt denied the presence of the virus among
its population, then took an active approach to contain it. Mauritania’s weak institutions and
economic conditions limited the government response to the pandemic, although it received
assistance from regional and international donors. Table 7 illustrates three essential indicators to
consider while addressing the region’s response: rising poverty rates, contraction of economic
growth rates in 2020, and recovery of the economy in 2021. Libya has the highest economic
contraction in 2020 and the most promising growth rate in 2021, while Sudan has registered the
lowest projected growth rate in 2021.
In fact, Sudan is heading towards a significant deterioration of its economy due to the
second military coup conducted by its armed forces on 23 October2020. The generals undermined
the political formula for the transitional government leading into civil disobedience, violence,
instability, and potential re-imposition of international sanctions. The increase of the poverty rates
across North Africa is another alarming factor. Sudan registered 46.5% of its population (the
highest rate) under the poverty line, Mauritania registered is 31%, and Egypt 32.5%. Algeria and
Morocco registered manageable rates of 5.5% and 4.8%, respectively, which can be managed
through poverty-alleviation programs.
Table 8. North Africa’s Vital Statistics and Growth Rates in 2020 and 2021
Countr
y

Populati Size
on
(km²)
(Number
)

Gross
Domes
tic
Produc
t
(Billio
n US$)

Algeria

43,053,0
54
6,777,45
3
36,471,7
66
11,694,7
21
4,524,69
8
593,339

171.15
8
26.197

Libya
Morocc
o
Tunisia
Maurita
nia
Western
Sahara*
Egypt
Sudan

100,388,
076
42,813,2
37

2,381
1,759

Gross
Nation
al
Incom
e
(per
capita
US$)
4,010

Life
Expecta
ncy
(Years)

76.88

Poverty 2020
Ration/P Real
op
GDP
Growth
Rate
(%) of
Populati
on
5.5
–4.9

Project
ed
GDP
Growt
h Rate
in 2021
(%)

5,410

72.91

NA

–59.7

123.2

3.4

446,3
00
155,3
60
1,030

119.7

3,200

76.68

4.8

–6.3

5.7

39.196

3,340

76,69

15.2

–8.6

3.0

7.601

1,660

64.92

31.0

–1.8

2.7

252,1
20
995,4
50

NA

NA

NA

NA

No Data

332,44
2
32.25

2,690

71.99

32.5

3.6

No
Data
3.3

820

65.311

46.5

–3.6

0.9
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*Western Sahara is classified as Occupied Territory by the United Nations. The territory is
annexed by Morocco.
Source: The International Monetary Fund, October 2021. World Economic Outlook. Available at:
file:///C:/Users/EDA023/Downloads/text.pdf (accessed on 23 October 2021)
Size and Population at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?view=map
(accessed on 11 November 2021).
The North African region began reporting Covid-19 cases towards the end of February
2020. They also took drastic measures to contain the pandemic immediately as in the case of
Morocco and Tunisia. They imposed partial curfews, then lockdowns. They closed their borders,
airports, ports, and enforced total lockdowns.
In Algeria, the lockdown led to reduction of the protest of the Hirak movement. The
infection rate in Algeria cloaked some of the highest rates in the region. Algeria registered 205,903
cases of infection, 5,894 deaths, and administered 14,082,920 vaccines. Algeria’s response to the
crisis was primarily governed by the nature of its economy, with heavy reliance on the oil sector
as the main revenue source. There was a drastic decline in oil demand Algeria’s foreign-exchange
reserves fell from an all-time high of $201.347 billion in 2013 to $59.43 billion, an all-time low in
2020.The weakness of its healthcare sector, deterioration of its hospitals, departure of some of its
best medical staff (brain drain) over the past three decades to Europe in particular, as well as
regional challenges such as the simmering conflict with Morocco, the war in Libya, and the
instability in Tunisia also made telling negative impact on its pandemic response.
Tunisia reported its first cases of the virus in March. The government imposed partial
curfews, and total lockdowns as the number of infections increased drastically. Initially, the
government announced an $850 million package to deal with the immediate socio-economic
impacts of the pandemic, in addition to tax relief and support to small and medium enterprises. By
May 2020, Tunisia seemed to have the pandemic under control, emerging from a lengthy lockdown
of five weeks. Tunisia registered 711,863 cases, 25,160 deaths, and administered 8,885,554
vaccines. Tunisia issued an international appeal, requesting assistance to deal with the pandemic.
The World, Bank, the US, and the EU provided some assistance. Overall, Tunisia’s ability to
confront the pandemic and to deal with its consequences deteriorated drastically in the fall of 2021
due to the escalation of political conflicts between the presidency and the parliament. The
consequences of the protracted war in Libya and the lockdowns at home and in neighboring
countries have increased unemployment rates in Tunisia and added to the misery.
Morocco’s response to the pandemic can be described as effective and proactive. As early
as March 2020, the government imposed a state of emergency and imposed partial curfews and
lockdowns with the help of its police and armed forces. A national fund was established and took
measures to tackle unemployment and deliver social services to the poor. State and society
organizations in the country managed to bring the virus under control and reopen the economy.
Overall, Morocco registered 9,44,378 cases, 14,621 deaths, and administered 46,094,289 vaccines.
Table 9. Status of Covid-19 in North Africa
Country
Algeria

Number
Cases
205,903
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Libya
354,866
5,033
NA
Morocco
944,378
14,621
46,094,289
Tunisia
711,863
25,160
8,885,554
Mauritania 36,989
792
1,300,831
Egypt
325,508
18,333
25,083,832
Sudan
40,433
3,099
2,111,141
Western
17
1
NA
Sahara
Source: The John Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering, the Covid-19 Database.
Available at: https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (accessed on October 23, 2021).
The State of Libya’s response to the pandemic was restricted by a decade-long civil and
proxy war and by the deterioration of its health sector. International appeals to stop the fighting
came from the UN and Western and Arab capitals. In response, the two warring camps in Tripoli
and Benghazi announced a humanitarian pause and pledged financial support to local governments
and healthcare institutions to boost their ability to respond to the pandemic. The European
countries were fearful of the Syrian model that under the conditions of the pandemic Libyans
would flee to European shores, coupled with the increasing number of migrants from the South
(Africa) towards the North (Europe). In fact, the pandemic is associated with the phenomena of
mistreatment to African migrants in Libya and the lack of resources to assist them or providing
them with the basic needs until a permanent solution is found.
The complexity of the security situation in Libya and the fact that the war became an
international proxy conflict dominated the Libyan scene even during the worst months of the
global crisis of corona. The solution to the conflict seemed to be in the European capitals, in
Ankara, and much less in Libya itself. As for domestic response to the conflict, the near collapse
of the healthcare sector is the most challenging aspect of the Libyan war. Libyans, who could
afford to pay for treatment usually, travelled to Arab and European countries, while those unable
to do so suffered the consequences at home. The departure of Libya’s most qualified medical
doctors is the most tragic aspect of Libya’s predicament in recent times. Its scientists, doctors,
engineers, etc. are employed in European countries and North America, while Libya is descending
into chaos. Libya registered 354,866 cases and 5,033 deaths; and no data is available on
vaccinations administered in the country.
The initial months of the coronavirus crisis in Egypt were dominated by denial of the
presence of the virus, then to recognition and a proactive policy. The government established a
crisis unit to handle the crisis, enforced curfews and lockdowns, and used state security measures
to deal with the pandemic. In the summer of 2020, cases were rising to over 1000 a day, then
declined in the fall, then increased in the early months of 2021, and stabilized in spring and the
summer of 2021. Obviously, the government managed to bring the virus under control. Overall,
Egypt registered 325,508 cases, 18,333 deaths, and 25,083,832 vaccines administered.
Sudan registered its first case of virus in March 2020. Like neighboring countries, cases
rose throughout the summer and the fall, registering some of the highest infectious and death rates
in the region. Sudan registered 40,433 cases, 3,099 deaths, and administered 2,111,141 vaccine
doses. Sudan’s overall response to the crisis is also governed by domestic instability, the military
coup of October 2019, the second coup in October 2021, lack of stability, decades of economic
collapse, deterioration of the health sector, and the departure of its most qualified doctors and
members of the medical establishment to other countries.
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As for Mauritanian, it registered its first cases of corona in March 2020. The country was
hit by two major waves of the virus in the spring and the fall of 2020, until the government and
non-governmental organizations managed to bring it under control. Mauritania imposed curfews
and total lockdowns. It had also closed its airports, ports, schools, and religious institutions.
Overall, Mauritania registered 36,989 cases, 792 deaths, and administered 1,300,831 vaccine
doses.
The Central Asian Region
The Central Asian region was hit hard by the pandemic especially in the first six months
of the crisis, in 2020. The geography and geopolitics of the region influenced drastically its ability
to respond to the challenges as well as the opportunities provided by the Covid-19 crisis. Central
Asia is a landlocked region, sandwiched between China and Russia, without access to international
markets. Central Asia’s main trade partners are China and Russia, while other regional trade
powerhouses such as Turkey, Iran, and India have presence in the region. Central Asia extended
its support to China in the early months of the crisis, while Beijing reciprocated the goodwill by
sending aid to the region when the virus spread in the region in the summer and fall of 2020.
Russia, Turkey, and India provided some assistance as well. The Central Asian economy is heavily
reliant on remittances of labor in Russia, EU, and other parts of the world. Lockdowns crippled
this aspect of the economy in countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, while Kazakhstan is
more reliant on fossil fuel revenue. Table 9 illustrates Central Asia’s vital statistics, primarily, its
actual growth rates in 2020, and projected growth rates in 2021.
Table 9. Central Asia’s Vital Statistics
Country

Populati
on
(Number
)

Size
(km²)

Gross
Domest
ic
Produc
t (GDP)
(Billion
US$)

Gross
Nation
al
Incom
e (Per
Capita
in
US$)

Life
Expectan
cy
(Years)

Povert
y
Ratio
2021
(%)

2020
GDP
Actual
Growt
h Rate
(%)

2021
GDP
Growt
h Rate
(%)

18,513,67 2,699 181,667 8,820
73.18
4.3
–2.6
3.3
3
Kyrgyzstan 6,456,200 191,80 8.271
1,240
71.60
20.1
–8.6
2.1
0
Tajikistan
9,321,623
8.301
1,070
71,09
26.3
4.5
5.0
Uzbekistan 33,580,35 440,55 57.727
1,800
71.57
14.1
1.7
6.1
0
5
Turkmenist 5,942,094 469,93 45.231
7,220
68.19
NA
–3.4
4.5
an
0
Source: The International Monetary Fund, October 2021. World Economic Outlook. Accessed on
October 23, 2021, at: file:///C:/Users/EDA023/Downloads/text.pdf
Size and Population at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?view=map
(accessed on 11 November 2021).
Kazakhstan
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The country-specific response to the crisis varied from one country to another in the region.
Moreover, the pandemic outlook in the region was blurred by state control of the pandemicnarrative. For example, Turkmenistan is yet to report any cases of Covid-19 in the country, while
Tajikistan reported 17,486, and no data on deaths. Other countries such as Kazakhstan were more
transparent in confronting the crisis, updating the public, and confronting the crisis with ambitious
interventionist governmental policies.
Central Asia lacks regional mechanisms to confront the crisis, despite the five countries in
the region sharing a common background, nearly similar governmental structures, economic
structures, etc. They also face similar economic, political, and security challenges. Their main
trading partners are the same, i.e., China and Russia, and they all are integrated into the Chinese
and Russian trade frameworks. Recognizing the importance of regional cooperation and the level
of regional burden, Kazakhstan sent 5,000 tons of flour to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Opportunities for regional cooperation exist not only in humanitarian assistance, but also in areas
such as digitalization of the healthcare system, administration, food distribution, and border
control.
Kazakhstan was hit hard by the pandemic as its main source of revenue was oil exports. Its
domestic trade volume and regional and international indicators also suffered. The lockdown at
the national, regional, and international levels crippled its economy leading to increased
unemployment rate, decline of trade with neighboring countries, and higher inflation rates.
However, the Government of Kazakhstan acted in a proactive manner. The government declared
emergency law, imposed several rounds of lockdowns to bring the pandemic under control, and
provided a proactive crisis-management package of $13 billion at the end of March 2020. An
ambitious package of tax exemptions, tax relief, deferral, and assistance to the most vulnerable
was introduced. The government increased social pension by 10% and provided monthly payments
to citizens influenced by the emergency law. The government has also supported the frontliners
such as doctors, nurses, medical technicians, and police forces in combatting the pandemic. The
government supported the agricultural sector, provided access to preferential loans, and
encouraged production. Small and medium enterprises also received a tax-relief package. Large
enterprises also received similar incentives. Overall, Kazakhstan registered 1,009,918 cases,
16,957
deaths,
and
administered
15,550,804
vaccines.
Table 10. Central Asia’s Covid-19 Status
Country

Number of
Cases
Kazakhstan
1,009,918
Kyrgyzstan
180,741
Tajikistan
17,456
Uzbekistan
184,233
Turkmenistan NA

Number of
Deaths
16,957
2,658
125
1,309
NA

Number of Vaccines Administered
15,550,804
1,677,709
NA
25,101,646
NA

Source: The John Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering, the Covid-19 Database.
Available at: https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (accessed on 23 October 2021).
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Kyrgyz government also pursued an active approach to the crisis. The Kyrgyz people are
well-known for voicing out their concerns and pressuring their government. The government
provided assistance package to main components of the economy, tax relief packages, subsidizing
banks to encourage small loans, food programs, healthcare assistance, etc. Bishkek secured some
necessary funding from the IMF and the Asian Development Bank to confront the crisis. The
World Bank reported challenging figures about Kyrgyzstan in 2020. Labor was hit the most due
to the lengthy first lockdown of 47 days. During this period, 40,000 people lost their jobs, inflation
rate shot up to 9.7%, real GDP contracted by 8.6%, depreciation of currency by 19%, a budget
deficit of 4.2%, and public debt increased as a percentage of the GDP from 51.6% in 2019, to
68.1% in 2020.17 As for the pandemic situation, Kyrgyzstan reported 180,741 cases and 2,658
deaths, while it administered 1,677,709 vaccines.
Tajikistan’s response was like other countries in the region, imposing curfews and
lockdowns, and initiating social policies and economic incentives. Tajikistan registered 17,456
cases and 125 deaths; no data is available on vaccinations.
Uzbekistan’s economy was hit hard by the pandemic due to closures and regional
deterioration of trade. The government introduced an Anti-Crisis Fund to deal with the challenges
imposed by the crisis. It provided tax-relief package, economic stimulus, and social services
programs. Overall, it has registered 184,233 cases, 1,309 deaths, and administered over 25,101,646
vaccines.
Given the fact that Central Asia shares a wide range of commonalities, it is incumbent on
the region to develop mechanisms of integration at least in the health sector. The five countries in
the region share history, geographical unity, cultural narratives, and a shared destiny. There is an
urgent need for the establishment of a Central Asia Crisis Management Center and an entity to
tackle cross-border crises.
Conclusion
The Covid-induced pandemic highlighted the need of regional cooperation as a critical
instrument for responding appropriately to future pandemics and crises facing the GME region.
The uniqueness of the Middle East and its vulnerability to crises make it incumbent on the region
to articulate regional responses to regional crises such as pandemics, water shortages, food
security, violence, extremism, and terrorism. Aligning with this thought, the region and its
subregions should consider establishing, for example, a Middle East Center for Disease Control, a
Gulf Crisis Management Center, a North African Crisis Management Center, and a Central Asian
Unified Crisis Management Center. While these ideas are within the reach on technical, funding,
and necessity grounds, the regional rivalry, proxy wars, sectarianism, and conflicts in the region
pose a major challenge to these ideas from becoming a reality.
The coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated such regional shortcomings and their impacts
on state response to the crisis. Primarily, states in the region relied heavily on their own ability to
mobilize national resources to confront the challenge. They also relied on receiving some
assistance from friends, allies, and international organizations. The region’s response, success, or
failure thereof was consistent with the international trends. The whole world was taken by surprise
by the outbreak of the pandemic in the early months of 2020. Gradually, the region adapted to it,
and brought it under control. While the crisis has surely tested the state and the region, it has also
provided valuable opportunities for the region at large, and its sub-regions in particular, to develop
unified responses to any upcoming crises. However, it remains to be seen if the region would seize
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the opportunity and develop such mechanisms for the sake of reducing regional conflicts and
promoting acceptable levels of development across the GME region.
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